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vehicles. This contribution uses the occasion of the German case to look at the 
provisions and principles of EU law applicable to road charges for light vehicles and 
undertake an assessment of the current developments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
General traffic in Germany does not currently have to pay for road use. 
However, since 2013, a debate has been raging back and forth in Germany 
about the introduction of road charges1 for light vehicles (below 3,5 tons). 
 
Germany is an EU Member State that prides itself of a strong and 
innovative automobile industry and, for example, still has no general speed 
limit imposed on motorways. Road taxes for individual traffic were long 
seen as a political taboo there. That changed in the run-up to the 2013 
general election, when the conservative government's Bavarian junior 
partner in the coalition decided to run a campaign to graze off voters on 
the right-hand edge of its spectrum. Playing outright on xenophobic 
resentment, the regional party called for foreigners to start paying for the 
use of notoriously clogged German motorways. 
 
Although that demand immediately raised concerns over its compatibility 
with European law and the major coalition partner was reluctant at first, 
the introduction of general usage charges for light traffic set was eventually 
enshrined in the acting government's 2013 Coalition Pact,2 however under 
the condition that it would not pose an extra burden on domestic vehicle 
owners. Consequently, the Coalition Pact speaks of the introduction of a 
'car toll3 to ensure that holders of passenger cars not registered in Germany 
contribute to the financing of the motorway network without taxing 
domestically registered vehicles higher than today' and 'with the proviso 
that no German vehicle owner is more heavily burdened than today'.4 
                                                
1 The term charges is used here to comprise all forms of direct charges levied for the 
use of roads, ie tolls for passage of certain roads, distance or time based usage fees, 
congestion or environmental charges and the like. Unlike taxes (eg a motor vehicles 
tax), the revenue of these charges is usually purpose-bound and does not flow toward 
the general budget. The German model is best described as a (time based) usage fee. 
For a terminological distinction, also Art 2(b) of the Eurovignette Directive (n 25). 
2 Heike Münzing, Zur Einführung einer Pkw-Maut in Deutschland, NZV 2014, 197, 
197. 
3 For terminological distinction see n 1. 
4 Both citations own translation from Coalition Treaty 2013, Deutschlands Zukunft 
gestalten, available at www.cdu.de/koalitionsvertrag (accessed 19 May  2015), 8: ‚ '… 
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Since then, the responsible ministry had tried to devise a law capable of 
bridging a seemingly impossible gap: imposing a road charge that would 
have no burdening effect on domestic car owners while nonetheless not 
appearing discriminatory by European law standards. 
 
The German government's immediate sparring partner was, of course, the 
European Commission, where the proposals were scrutinized at various 
stages.5 In June 2015, the Commission decided to open infringement 
proceedings against Germany.6 The Commission's main concerns 
appertain to indirect discrimination based on nationality. One yardstick of 
measurement in connection to this issue will be the principles laid down in 
a 2012 Commission Communication7 on road infrastructure charges for 
private vehicles. 
 
The Netherlands and Austria, the Member States potentially most 
affected by a foreigner-only charge among Germany's neighbours, 
announced that they were contemplating considering independent 
infringement actions against Germany in case the Commission failed to 
take up the case.8 Both sides, Germany and the opposing Member States, 
have produced expert opinions on the legality of the package and 
submitted them to the Commission.9 
 
The road charges package gained parliamentary consent in spring 2015 and 
was initially set to take effect as of 1 January 2016. Due to the opening of 
infringement proceedings, however, the entry into force was temporarily 
suspended to await their outcome.10 
 
This contribution explores the EU law framework for road charges in 
detail. It uses the occasion of the German case to look at the provisions 
and principles of EU law applicable to road charges for light vehicles and 
undertake an assessment of current developments. The German case has, 
of course, received some scholarly attention in German writing.11 However, 
                                                                                                                                 
europarechtskonforme PKW-Maut, mit der wir Halter von nicht in Deutschland 
zugelassenen PKW an der Finanzierung zusätzlicher Ausgaben für das Autobahnnetz 
beteiligen wollen, ohne im Inland zugelassene Fahrzeuge höher als heute zu belasten', 
and 29: ‚ '…mit der Maßgabe, dass kein Fahrzeughalter in Deutschland stärker 
belastet wird als heute'.  
5 Eg Com Press Release of 2 December 2014, SPEECH/14/2280. 
6 Com Press Release of 18 June 2015, IP/15/5200. 
7 Communication on the application of national road infrastructure charges on light 
private vehicles, COM(2012) 199 fin. 
8 Eg derstandard.at online version of 12 May 2015, Wien sucht Verbündete gegen 
deutsche Maut. 
9 For Germany, Rechtsgutachten by Christian Hillgruber of 17 October 2014 (and 
reply to Commission concerns on 13 December 2014), available at 
http://www.bmvi.de (accessed 19 May  2015); for Austria,  hntv.de online version of 15 
May 2015, Österreich macht mobil gegen Pkw-Maut. 
10 BR.de online version of 18 June 2015, Dobrindt verschiebt Maut-Start. 
11 Münzing (n 2); Friedemann Kainer and Sarah Ponterlitschek, 'Einführung von 
nationalen Straßenbenutzungsgebühren für Pkw', ZRP 2013, 198; Daniel Engel and 
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English contributions on the issue, taking on a broader perspective, are 
sparse. 
 
II. THE GERMAN FEE AND TAX REBATE MECHANISM 
 
The legislative package brought about in Germany comprises two linked 
measures. Its first leg introduces a road usage fee12 for passenger cars 
(categories M and M1G) on motorways and federal through-roads.13 As the 
package's second leg, the general passenger car fee is flanked by changes to 
the motor vehicles tax14 with a view to offsetting its financial burden for 
holders of automobiles registered in Germany.15 
 
The time-based fee for the use of motorways and federal through-roads 
applies generally to all light vehicles in classes M and M1G (up to eight 
seats, including eg mobile homes), but not to motorcycles. 16 Foreign and 
domestic vehicles are caught alike, but foreign vehicles pay for motorway 
use only and may use through-roads free of charge.17 The fee is to be 
collected through an electronic permit (vignette) that must be purchased 
beforehand.18 For vehicles registered in Germany, the fee is to be 
automatically assessed and collected by the motor vehicle authority, which 
already keeps the vehicle registration register.19 German vehicle owners 
will thus have no additional paperwork to do. 
 
The amount of the fee is calculated according to motor power and 
emissions and is set at a yearly maximum of 130 Euros,20 with the expected 
average around 80 Euros.21 Short-term permits will be available for 10 days 
and two months and set at three progressive levels corresponding to motor 
power and emissions level (5/10/15 Euros and 16/22/30 Euros respectively).22 
                                                                                                                                 
Jan Singbartl, 'Die Einführung einer Pkw-Maut zulasten von EU-Ausländern – 
europarechtskonform?', vr 2014, 289; Stefan Korte and Matti Gurreck, 'Die 
europarechtliche Zulässigkeit der sog. Pkw-Maut', EuR 2014, 422; Lukas Beck, 
'Autobahnmaut und Europarecht', NZV 2014, 289; Christian Maaß, 'Die PKW-
Maut ist erst der Anfang', ZUR 2014, 449; Matthias Zabel, 'Die geplante 
Infrastrukturabgabe (‚Pkw-Maut') im Lichte von Art 92 AEUV', NVwZ 2015, 186; 
Volker Boehme-Neßler, 'Pkw-Maut für Ausländer?', NVwZ 2014, 97. 
12 For terminological distinction see n 1. 
13 'Infrastrukturabgabe für die Benutzung von Bundesfernstraßen'; Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Einführung einer Infrastrukturabgabe für die Benutzung von 
Bundesstraßen (InfrastrukturabgabenG), BTDrs. 18/3990, final version BTDrs 
18/4455. 
14 'Kraftfahrzeugsteuer'; for terminological distinction see n 1. 
15 Entwurf eines Zweiten Verkehrssteueränderungsgesetzes, BTDrs. 18/3991, final 
version BTDrs 18/4448. 
16 § 1(1) InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
17 § 1(2) InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
18 § 5(1) InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
19 § 6 InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
20 Anlage zu § 8 InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
21 BTDrs 18/3990 (n 13), 30, sets the average at 74 euros, subsequent estimates are 
higher. 
22 BTDrs. 18/4455 (n 13), 14. 
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The second leg of the mechanism corresponds to the first and undertakes 
to lower the motor vehicles tax for domestically registered vehicles. In 
fact, the provision introduced in the motor vehicles tax law is an exact 
(negative) copy of the one that details out the fee levels in the road usage 
fee law.23 By virtue of that flanking second leg, German vehicle owners 
receive a vehicles tax rebate for the exact amount of their fee burden. For 
them therefore, the economic effect of the usage fee will be neutral. 
 
The measures apply exclusively to light vehicles, ie passenger cars and small 
transport vehicles. Heavy goods vehicles (HGV; above 3,5 tons) are already 
subject to a (distance based) motorway usage fee in Germany. That fee was 
introduced in 200524 in line with the Eurovignette Directive.25 That 
Directive stipulates that HGVs may be billed for the cost of constructing, 
operating and developing infrastructure and to that end defines common 
rules on distance-based tolls and time-based user charges (vignettes) for 
HGVs for the use of certain infrastructure only.26 It is not applicable to 
fees for light vehicle traffic as the ones now envisaged in Germany. 
 
III. LIGHT VEHICLE CHARGES UNDER EU LAW 
 
The Commission's 2012 Communication underlines the principle that, 
given the absence of harmonization in the field, Member States are in 
principle free to implement road charges for light vehicles.27 Nonetheless, 
according to the Communication, such charges may not run counter the 
principles of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 
TFEU) and proportionality. This will be examined here. 
 
Article 18 and the proportionality principle, however, apply only 
subsidiarily, when more specific provisions fail to bite. In that regard, a fee 
and rebate mechanism like the one envisaged in Germany might run 
counter to a number of such more specific EU law provisions. Immediately 
relevant here is the TFEU's Roads and Transport Chapter, ie Articles 90 
et seq. and secondary law. Potential conflicts may however also arise in the 
area of the fundamental freedoms (particularly28 as regards free movement 
of goods under Article 34 TFEU) and the provisions on customs duties 
(Article 30 TFEU) and indirect taxation (Article 110 TFEU). The 
applicability and substance of those provisions regarding road usage 
charges will thus be examined here first. 
                                                
23 BTDrs. 18/3991 (n 15), Art 1 no 7 (changes to § 9 (6) to (8)). 
24 Bundesfernstraßenmautgesetz, BGBl 2011 I S 1378; LKW-Maut-Verordnung, BGBl 
2003 I S 1003. 
25 Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain 
infrastructures, [1999] OJ L 187/42. 
26 For more see Detlev Boeing, Matthias Kotthaus, Tim Maxian Rusche, Art 91, para 
94 ff, in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, Martin Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der 
europäischen Union – Kommentar, 47th supp 2012.  
27 Communication 2012 (n 7), 3. 
28 For an assessment under Art 45 TFEU see Kainer and Ponterlitschek (n 11), 200; 
Engel and Singbartl (n 11), 289 ff.  
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It is important to point out in that context that many of the Treaty 
provisions potentially applicable to a road fee mechanism are mutually 
exclusive. This is, as will be shown in greater detail when those norms are 
discussed, particularly so as regards the prohibitions of customs duties and 
discriminatory indirect taxes (Articles 30 and 110 TFEU) vis-à-vis each 
other as well as vis-à-vis the prohibition of restrictions on goods (Article 34 
TFEU). Which of these norms is applicable, however, depends on how one 
looks at the facts at hand, i.e. what the actual effects of the measure under 
scrutiny are deemed to be. As is not uncommon in legal disputes, the facts 
lend themselves to different assessments of their effects. Depending on 
that assessment, one or the other provision will apply. For the German fee 
and rebate mechanism in particular, the assessment of the effects of the 
measure is actually a key issue in the dispute (particularly: are there 
combined or separate effects for the two legs of the measure and are those 
effects the result of a customs- or tax-like measure or are they some other 
form of restriction affecting goods?). 
 
Against that background, this contributon takes the widest possible 
approach when looking at Treaty norms that, depending on the assessment 
of the effects of the measure, might potentially apply. Accordingly, all of 
the aforementioned provisions,  i.e. Articles 30, 34 and 110 TFEU, will be 
examined here notwithstanding that in the end, only one of them can 
apply. This also explains why Article 34 is discussed towards the end of the 
paper as one final and admittedly remote possibility, although that 
provision does usually not apply to measures involving charges or taxes (but 
instead yields to the more specific norms of Articles 30 and 110):29 If none 
of those more specific norms is deemed to apply because the effects of the 
mechanism are deemed not to fall under the customs or tax provisions, ie 
if there were no visible customs or tax effects, maybe the measure has 
other, non-fee related prohibitive effects that might be assessed under 
Article 34.30 
 
1. Compatibility With the Transport Chapter: Art 92 TFEU 
The central focus for assessing the legality of road usage fees lies on the 
TFEU's traffic Chapter and, there in particular, on Article 92's standstill 
obligation. Article 92 provides that in the absence of harmonization (under 
Article 91 TFEU) 'no Member State may … make … provisions governing 
the subject on 1 January 1958 … less favorable in their direct or indirect 
effect on carriers of other Member States as compared with carriers who 
are nationals of that State.' 
 
                                                
29 Consistent jurisprudence, eg Case C-313/05 Brzeziński ECLI:EU:C:2007:33, para 50; 
Case C-228/98 Dounias ECLI:EU:C:2000:65 para 39; Case C-383/01 De Danske 
Bilimportører ECLI:EU:C:2003:352 para 32. 
30 Potentially less restrictive (applicability of Article 34 to charges where there are 
excessive effects on goods) older case-law Case C-47/88 Commission/Denmark 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:449, paras 12 ff; Case 31/67 Stier ECLI:EU:C:1968:23, 241. 
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Article 92 is thus two-sided. First, as generally in EU law, where 
harmonization (or EU-led liberalization) has occurred, the conditions 
stipulated therein prevail. Second, in the absence of harmonization, ie 
regarding usage charges for light vehicles, a combination of non-
discrimination and standstill applies: foreign and domestic users of traffic 
systems may be subjected to historic, perpetuate differing conditions of 
use.31 The prohibition contained in that second regulatory side of Article 
92 is therefore less stringent than the general non-discrimination clause of 
Article 18 TFEU, since those kinds of less favorable treatment that were in 
place already at the standstill date in 1958, remain possible.32 
 
A. Secondary Law 
The main pieces of harmonization in the area of road charges are the 
Eurovignette Directive 1999/62/EC33 and Council Decision 65/27134 on 
competition in transport. 
 
a. The Eurovignette Directive 
Relevance of the Eurovignette Directive in the current context is easily 
dismissed: it concerns only road pricing for HGVs, ie vehicles for the 
carriage of goods by road above 3,5 tons.35 The fee imposed by Germany 
applies to small (eight seats or less) vehicles for passenger transport only, 
irrespective of weight (although most will be below 3,5 tons).36 Although 
the Directive thus sets maximum levels for road usage charges in 
particular,37 the German general road usage fee does not conflict with 
them. 
 
b. The 1965 Decision 
As regards the 1965 Decision, two provisions (both still in force)38 might be 
relevant for a road usage charge: Article 1(a) prohibits double taxation of 
motor vehicles by a Member State other than that in which they are 
registered. Article 4 stipulates that Member States may not apply any 
specific taxes to the carriage of goods by road in addition to turnover tax. 
On the formal face of course, a road charge is neither a vehicles tax nor a 
tax on goods transport. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, its 
effects might be equivalent to either type of tax. 
 
A finding of equivalent effects of a road charge to taxes has two 
implications: on the one hand, it might justify a re-classification of the 
charge as a vehicles tax proper. This question is dealt with in the present 
                                                
31 Also Boeing et al(n 25) Art 92, para 4. 
32 Also Peter Schäfer, Art 92, para 6, in Rudolf Streinz (ed) EUV/AEUV-Kommentar2 
(2012). 
33 See n 25. 
34 Council Decision 65/271/EC on the harmonisation of certain provisions affecting 
competition in transport by rail, road and inland waterway, [1965] OJ 88/1500. 
35 Art 2(d) Eurovignette Directive. 
36 § 1(1) InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
37 Annex II Eurovignette Directive. 
38 Also Boeing et al (n 25) Art 91, para 39. 
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section On the other hand, effects equivalent to a tax on goods might 
bring a road charge within the scope of application of Articles 30, 34 or 110 
TFEU, which all deal with different aspects of cost-based obstacles to the 
marketing of goods in the internal market. This latter aspect will be 
discussed in separate sections on those provisions further below. 
 
A suspicion that it might be appropriate to re-classify of a road charge as a 
vehicles tax might arise depending on the actual effects of the measure. 
After all, EU law as a matter of principle takes an effects-based, never a 
formalistic approach, when assessing the compatibility of national 
measures. 
 
The German example is such a border-line case, where an initial suspicion 
as to tax-equivalent effects of a measure that is formally denominated a 
charge arises. The reason for this lies in the existence of an intrinsic link 
between the German road charge and the German motor vehicles tax 
system. 
 
The alleged link is firstly factual in the sense that the changes to the 
vehicles tax law were taken in parallel with the introduction of the road fee 
and with the declared aim of neutralizing its tax effects. Secondly, the link 
is also functional, since the provisions introduced to the vehicles tax law 
are an exact negative copy of the road fee mechanism. These measures are 
therefore two sides of the same coin: they cannot be split, would not have 
been taken individually or separately and could not achieve the regulatory 
aim behind them individually.  
 
The Court has already in the past dealt with a German mechanism 
coupling a time-based road fee with a reduction of domestic motor 
vehicles taxes. Although the Court stopped short of re-qualifying the road 
charge as a vehicles tax in the sense of Decision 65/271, it recognized the 
close factual link between such a charge and vehicles taxation: an 
introduction of the charge might jeopardize harmonization measures to 
eliminate the double taxation of motor vehicles.39 
 
The Advocate General for that case, Francis Jacobs, was even clearer as 
regards the classification of a road charge as a measure equivalent to a 
vehicles tax:  
 
In the absence of harmonization of the rates of vehicle duty, one 
consequence of the elimination of double taxation is that the 
burden of vehicle duty may vary as between vehicles from two 
different Member States[.] The introduction of road tax …, 
combined with the reduction in … vehicle duty, had the express 
aim of dealing with the consequences of such disparities for the 
conditions of competition of transport undertakings. … In my 
view, it is difficult to reconcile the intended effects of such a 
                                                
39 Case C-195/90 Commission/Germany ECLI:EU:C:1992:219, para 27. 
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measure with the goal of eliminating the double taxation of motor 
vehicles, which goal must in my view be taken to include the 
avoidance of measures having an equivalent effect, in whole or in 
part, to such double taxation. The [road charge at hand] might be 
thought to have such an equivalent effect, because it introduces a 
charge paid by carriers from other Member States which has the 
specific aim of enabling the burden of vehicle duty paid by 
German carriers to be reduced.40 
 
The Advocate General was therefore clear that the concept of double 
taxation of motor vehicles in the 1965 Decision included measures having 
an equivalent effect and that a road charge is to be regarded as such a 
measure where it seeks to counterbalance the burden of vehicles taxation 
for transporters. In other words, the Advocate General recognized that an 
intrinsic link between the vehicles tax system and a road charge justifies 
classifying the charge as a measure of equivalent effect to vehicles tax. 
 
Whether or not a road charge is to be re-classified to fall under the 1956 
Decision thus depends on the circumstances of the case and, more 
precisely, on the presence of an intrinsic link. Where, like in the German 
case, a road charge is functionally coupled with a rebate on motor vehicles 
taxes, that mechanism simply shifts a part of the vehicles tax burden from 
one law to another. Such a formal move should not affect the nature of 
that fee as a functional part of the vehicles tax system. 
 
This is underlined in the case at hand by the fact that from the point of 
view of German-registered vehicle owners, the motor vehicles tax liability 
does effectively not change in any way –- neither in terms of the overall tax 
burden nor in terms of associated paperwork. They will not factually 
notice the regulatory change at all. 
 
Where a road fee is an intrinsic functional part of the vehicles tax 
mechanism, its extension to foreign-registered vehicles would have to be 
considered a form of double vehicles taxation: foreign vehicles are subject 
to a vehicles tax in their Member State of registration and will, in addition, 
be submitted to bear part of a national (here: German) vehicles tax burden. 
In these circumstances a road usage fee for light vehicles, like the one 
devised for Germany, runs counter to Article 1(a) of Decision 65/271. 
 
B. Primary Law 
In addition to a potential infringement of the 1965 Decision, the combined 
road fee and rebate mechanism might also conflict with the standstill leg of 
Article 92 TFEU. Two questions arise here. The first is whether Article 92 
applies to light vehicle traffic at all. Secondly, if it applies, what is the 
actual import of the prohibition contained in Article 92. 
 
                                                
40 Opinion of the AG for Case C-195/90 Commission/Germany ECLI:EU:C:1992:123, 
paras 59 and 60. 
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a. Applicability of Article 92 
Doubts as to the applicability of Article 92 to light vehicles traffic, 
particularly to individual traffic and passenger cars, might arise from its 
wording, which refers only to 'carriers' 
('transporteurs'/'Verkehrsunternehmer' in the original French and German 
versions). This indicates that non-commercial individual traffic might not 
fall under the standstill and non-discrimination clauses of Article 92. Any 
subsequent introduction of additional burdens or unequal treatment in 
relation to non-commercial traffic would then only be subject to other 
Treaty provisions. 
 
This also seems to be the Commission's reading of Article 92, which in the 
early stages of the German plans stated that '[r]oad tolling schemes have to 
comply [only] with general Treaty principles as concerns … passenger cars. 
… As far as passenger cars are concerned, [therefore], Member States are 
free to set the level of circulation taxes for resident drivers'41 as long as this 
does not constitute discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
Consequently, 'reducing circulation taxes for resident users … and 
implementing proportional user charges for all users would, in principle, 
not constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality.'42 This statement 
encouraged the German government to give its plans the final go ahead 
and include them in the 2013 coalition pact.43 
 
As was shown, the German fee will not apply to light vehicles of more than 
eight seats and not to HGV traffic. Nonetheless, transport services in light 
vehicles, ie individual and group taxi services and deliveries, will be subject 
to the fee. Irrespective of the size of the undertaking providing such 
services (ie the self-employed taxi driver or delivery person as well as large 
taxi or deliveries firms), the fee will therefore affect undertakings 
('Unternehmen') in the sense of EU law44 and - therefore - also in the sense 
of Article 92 ('[U]nternehmer').45 As a result, that aspect of the measure is 
to be assessed under Article 92. 
 
b. Non-Discrimination and Standstill 
As regards, next, the regulatory content of Article 92, the key question is 
whether the prohibition laid down therein prohibits any kind of 
deterioration of the conditions of traffic - even where they hit domestic 
and foreign users alike - or just discriminatory deteriorations of traffic 
conditions. For their differing views on the leeway accorded by Article 92 
to Member States to move away from the traffic conditions of 1958, these 
                                                
41 Written answer by Siim Kallas on behalf of the Commission to the question of 
MEP Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), 8 October 2013, Doc. no. P-011520-13. 
42 ibid. 
43 Korte and Gurreck (n 11), 422. 
44 On the EU law concept of an undertaking Alison Jones, 'The Boundaries of an 
Undertaking in EU Competition Law' (2012) 8(2) Eur. Comp. J,  , 301, 301 ff. 
45 Equally  Korte and Gurreck(n 11), 427; Zabel (n 11), 187 ff 
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two readings of Article 92 are referred to as static (the former, stricter 
reading) vs dynamic (the latter, more generous reading).46 
 
The more generous reading draws upon political arguments: it argues that 
the interpretation of Article 92 should take into account the drastic 
changes that the conditions of intra-community transport experienced 
since the standstill date in 1958. In particular, road transport burgeoned 
along with the progressive integration of the internal market. Accordingly, 
Member States should retain freedom to dynamically react to this 
development through curbing measures, like road charges, that abolish 
benefits for foreign carriers as long as they entail no discrimination.47 
 
The (prevalent) more stringent reading48 is based on the case law on 
Article 92 and its wording. The leading case, Commission/Germany, of 1992 
has very similar facts to the current German mechanism. 
Commission/Germany concerned the first German attempt to establish an 
HGV fee (time based) for the use of federal roads and motorways in the 
early 1990s. The measure fell quite clearly within the ambit of Article 92: 
like in the current system, the idea was to set off the fee domestically via a 
reduction of motor vehicles taxes. The Court of Justice found that Article 
92 'is intended to prevent the … common transport policy from being … 
obstructed … by the adoption … of national measures the direct or indirect 
effect of which is to alter unfavorably the situation … of carriers from 
other Member States in relation to national carriers.'49 This applies 
irrespective of the (eg environmental) objectives of such a measure.50 
Article 92, however, 'does not preclude a Member State from adopting 
measures which have the same unfavorable effects for national carriers as 
for carriers of other Member States.'51 According to this balanced 
standard, the measure at the time fell afoul of Article 92. This reading of 
Article 92 was also confirmed in subsequent jurisprudence.52 
 
The Court's approach is a strict or static one in the sense that any changes 
to the conditions of competition between domestic and foreign carriers 
are prohibited. This means that foreign carriers may, in particular, not be 
                                                
46  Boeing et al (n 25), Art 92, paras 5 ff;  Korte, and Matti Gurreck (n 11), 429. 
47 Christian Jung, Art 92, para 5, in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), 
EUV/AEUV-Kommentar4 (2011); Gerhard Muzak, Art 92, para 11, in Heinz Mayer and 
Karl Stöger, Kommentar zu EUV und AEUV, 133rd supp 2012; Thomas Ebenroth, 
Rafael Fischer and Christoph Sorek, 'Deutsche Straßenbenutzungsgebühr und EG-
Recht', BB 1989, 1566, 1574 ff 
48 Matthias Knauff, § 6 Transportrecht, 303, para 65, in Matthias Ruffert (ed), 
Europäisches Sektorales Wirtschaftsrecht (2013); Boeing et al (n 25) Art 92, para 12; 
Schäfer (n 32), para 7; Gerhard Stadler, Art 72, para 4, in Jürgen Schwarze (ed), EU-
Kommentar2 (2009). 
49 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 20. 
50 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 33. 
51 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 21. 
52 Joined Cases C-184/91 and C-221/91 Oorburg ECLI:EU:C:1993:121, para 12 ff. 
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deprived of competitive advantages that they might have enjoyed vis-à-vis 
domestic carriers. 
 
The Court explains its stringent approach with the preservation of 
maneuvering space in the common transport policy and the need to keep 
legislative options open. In addition, a stringent reading is relatively more 
effective in terms of harmonization of transport conditions in the internal 
market, since it fosters Member States' willingness to compromise on 
transport legislation in the Council.53 
 
A strict reading of Article 92 would mean that any introduction of road 
charges vis-à-vis foreign users that were formerly allowed to use roads for 
free is in conflict with Article 92, unless domestic users are subjected to a 
corresponding charge that forestalls a change to the conditions of 
competition between foreign and domestic road users. This means, in 
other words, that the level of charges between foreign and domestic users 
must be kept at the same distance. If the former level was zero, new 
charges may only be homogeneously for foreign and domestic users to set 
the level for both groups equally at zero plus X. 
 
Coupled with the rebate on the level of motor vehicles taxes, the two-
legged German mechanism does not impose 'the same unfavorable 
effects'54 on domestic and foreign carriers alike. Instead, foreign carriers 
are deprived of the formerly enjoyed benefit of free use of German 
motorways, whereas, if the infrastructure law is read in conjunction with 
the vehicles tax rebate, domestic carriers effectively continue to use these 
roads for free. This is, in other words, not just a mere deprivation of 
foreign carriers of a benefit formerly enjoyed, but an effectively less 
favorable economic position as compared to German carriers for whom 
fees are fully set off. 
 
Without the intertwined effects of the road fee on the one hand and the 
rebate on the motor vehicles tax on the other, the introduction of road 
fees would therefore be in line with the ECJ's reading of Article 92.55 In 
the way the mechanism effectively works, however, it is incompatible with 
that provision.56 
 
A fee mechanism like the one devised in Germany falls foul of Article 92 
even under the more generous reading of that provision:57 The fact that in 
effect only foreign carriers pay for road use while domestic carriers use 
them for free is not just an alteration of the conditions of competition to 
the detriment of foreign carriers (static reading). Rather, it is a unilateral 
imposition of one-sided negative effects on those carriers which will place 
                                                
53 Equally Boeing et al(n 25) Art 92, para 12. 
54 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 21. 
55 Equally Zabel (n 11), 189 ff. 
56 Equally ibid, 190. 
57 Different however ibid, 190. 
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them in a worse economic position than German carriers (dynamic 
reading). Even with a generous reading of Article 92 therefore, which is not 
warranted under the ECJ's case-law, that measure could not hold. 
 
Concerns under Article 92 could thus only be eliminated where, contrary 
to what is suggested here, the two mechanisms were looked at separately 
and the rebate on motor vehicles tax was artificially blinded out from the 
examination of the usage fee.58 Again, that result would be the same both 
under a dynamic as well as under a static reading of Article 92: examining 
the law on fees alone, the competitive situation of domestic and foreign 
carriers vis-à-vis each other is not altered if the former fee level was zero 
and the level is now raised to an equal level of zero plus X for everyone. By 
itself therefore (ie blinding out the set off mechanism), the introduction of 
road charges would constitute a measure with 'the same unfavorable 
effects for national carriers as for carriers of other Member States'59 in the 
Court's reading of Article 92. However, as was pointed out earlier, an 
isolated examination is not called for, given that the two legs of the 
measure are intrinsically, ie factually and functionally, linked. In fact, an 
artificial separate assessment only abets the circumvention of the 
prohibition in Article 92.60 
 
Where the combined non-discrimination and standstill prohibition of 
Article 92 are infringed, there is no leeway for justification arguments:61 
Article 92's prohibition is absolute.62 The only exception to this rule is the 
possibility foreseen in Article 92 to obtain specific Council authorization 
for a given measure. 
 
In conclusion therefore, a road fee mechanism like the one devised in 
Germany is incompatible with Article 92 combined non-discrimination 
and standstill requirements insofar as it is applied to transport services in 
light vehicles, ie individual and group taxi services and deliveries.63 A 
separate examination of the two components of that mechanism with a 
view to expunging such concerns would artificially negate the measure's 
unequal effects for domestic and foreign carriers and is therefore to be 
rejected. 
 
2. Tax Effect on Goods: Articles 30 and 110 TFEU 
Articles 30 and 110 TFEU are two closely related provisions prohibiting 
different forms of charges levied on goods. A road usage charge might 
come within the ambit of those norms for its potential price effect on 
                                                
58 Similarly (regarding a separation of the two measures in time) Korte and  Gurreck 
(n 11), 431; also Kainer and  Ponterlitschek  (n 11), 200. 
59 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 21. 
60 Similarly Korte and  Gurreck(n 11), 431. 
61 Commission/Germany (n 39), para 33; Case C-17/90, Pinaud Wieger, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:283, para 11 ff. 
62 Also  Korte and Gurreck(n 11), 434;  Zabel (n 11), 190;  Jung  (n 46) Art 92, para 9. 
63 Equally  Engel and  Singbartl(n 11), 293; also (although critical of that result)  Kainer 
and Ponterlitschek (n 11), 201. 
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transported goods: extra charges borne by transporters of goods in light 
vehicles (eg express couriers) transported through or imported into a 
Member State imposing such charges will be added onto the price of those 
goods: '[A] charge which is imposed not on products as such, but on the 
specific activity of an undertaking in connection with products … falls 
within the scope' of those provisions 'in so far as it has an immediate effect 
on the cost of national and imported products.'64 
 
Even if a road charge does not directly target goods, it nonetheless affects 
them in a manner similar to a direct goods tax. As it will be elaborated 
further below, that potential cost effects of a road charge for imported vis-
à-vis national products brings the charge within the scope of Articles 30 or 
110.65 
 
It is of course true that the quantitative scale of the charge's effect on 
goods is limited insofar as by far most goods transports on the road use 
HGVs. Nonetheless, as it was pointed out, certain transport services 
typically rely on light vehicles, like mini vans. This is particularly so for 
quick (overnight or same-day) deliveries, eg of urgent parcels, 
pharmaceuticals, small spare parts etc. 
 
In the neighbouring area of measures of equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions on the importations of goods (Article 34) the case-law takes a 
markedly wide approach when assessing the effect of state measures on 
goods: it includes any measures (except selling arrangements, discussed 
below) capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-Community trade,66 without there being any minimum threshold for 
its application: no distinction is drawn there according to the effect of a 
measure on trade.67 The bottom-line drawn in that regard is only where 
effects are uncertain or speculative.68 That is, however, not the case here, 
given certain goods are manifestly transported by use of light vehicles. 
 
In sum therefore, the Treaty provisions relating to goods are directly 
relevant also for road charges for light vehicles. The fact that the overall 
quantity of goods transported in light vehicles is less than for HGV 
transports does not exclude the applicability of those provisions. 
 
 
 
                                                
64 Both citations Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten ECLI:EU:C:2007:657,  para 
43. 
65 Already Case 20/76 Schöttle ECLI:EU:C:1977:26, para 14 ff; Case 252/86, Bergandi 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:112, para 27; Case C-90/94 Haar Petroleum ECLI:EU:C:1997:368, 
para 38; similarly Joined Cases 317/86, 48/87, 49/87, 285/87, 363/87 to 367/87, 65/88 and 
78/88 to 80/88 Lambert ECLI:EU:C:1989:125, para 3 ff. 
66 See, eg, Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle ECLI:EU:C:1994:368, para 
28; Case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, para 5. 
67 See Case C-126/91 Yves Rocher ECLI:EU:C:1993:191, para 21. 
68 See Case C-379/92 Peralta ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, para 24. 
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A. Principles of Application 
While Article 30 addresses charges levied at the border and because a 
border is crossed, Article 110 deals with fiscal rules within the Member 
State, ie charges levied once the goods are inside the State's territory.69 So 
the focus of Article 30 is on measures affecting the cost basis of imported 
foreign goods, whereas Article 110 focuses on differences in the tax 
treatment of similar goods irrespective of their origin.70 In addition to this 
difference in scopes of application, differing standards apply: Article 30 is a 
relatively stricter norm in that it incorporates an absolute prohibition, not 
open to justification,71 which does not (like Article 110) hinge upon a 
finding of discrimination or protectionism in the measure.72 Both norms 
are mutually exclusive: a state measure will only fall under either one of 
them.73 
 
Two observations are particularly important in delineating the respective 
scopes of application vis-à-vis road charges. Firstly, if a charge is part of the 
'general system of internal taxation'74 in that it applies to all products at a 
given stage of marketing, it falls under Article 110.75 Secondly, a mechanism 
that leads to a complete offset of the price effect of a charge in relation to 
domestic goods is always a matter of Article 30 – even if it is by its form 
designed like an integral part of the domestic fiscal or parafiscal systems.76 
 
In the German example, the road usage fee is not a charge specifically 
targeting imported goods. Nonetheless, it will fall under Article 30, not 
Article 110, insofar as domestic transporters of goods are effectively 
compensated for the burden imposed by the road charge via the rebate 
mechanism. If no compensation takes place, the yardstick for EU law 
compatibility is Article 110. 
 
Which of the two norms is to be applied thus primarily depends on the 
approach taken towards the two legs of the mechanism: do the combined 
fee and rebate mechanism together constitute one measure or are they 
separate measures? If examined together, the measure has the effect of 
fully compensating domestic transporters, thereby shielding goods 
transported by domestic road users from the burden. That cost and price 
neutrality is in fact, as was shown, the declared aim of the measure. 
Consequently, the more stringent standard of Article 30 would apply. 
Were it was, however, to be found that the road fee and the tax rebate 
                                                
69 Eg Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2013), 52ff. 
70 For more Hans-Georg Kamann, Art 30, para 23, and Art 110, para 32, in Rudolf 
Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV-Kommentar2 (2012). 
71 Barnard(n 69), 50. 
72 Eg Joined Cases 2/69 and 3/69 Diamantarbeiders ECLI:EU:C:1969:30, para 15 ff.  
73 Case 10/65 Deutschmann ECLI:EU:C:1965:75,  473. 
74 Case 39/82 Donner ECLI:EU:C:1983:3, para 7. 
75 ibid, para 8. 
76 Joined Cases C-78/90 to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:118, para 27 ff; Case C-72/92 Scharbatke ECLI:EU:C:1993:858, para 
10; Case C-17/91 Lornoy ECLI:EU:C:1992:514, para 21. 
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mechanism have nothing to do with each other and constitute separate 
measures, a separate examination (of, then, only the road charge) would be 
carried out under Article 110. 
 
B. Traffic Charges As Equivalents of Customs Duties? 
Article 30 bans charges having equivalent effect to customs duties, ie 
charges that are levied on goods because those goods cross a border 
between member states:77 '[A]ny pecuniary charge, however small and 
whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed 
unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they 
cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense, 
constitutes a charge having equivalent effect within the meaning of [Art 30 
TFEU], even if it is not imposed for the benefit of the state, is not 
discriminatory or protective and if the product on which the charge is 
imposed is not in competition with any domestic product.'78 
 
This is, therefore, an absolute prohibition without possibility for 
justification.79 It is not subject to a de minimis logic ('however small'), 
applies irrespective of the aims and purposes of the charge and is not 
limited to discriminatory charges. 
 
a. Direct or Indirect Effect on Goods 
Older case-law seems to suggest that Article 30 only related to charges 
'being imposed specifically upon a product' and thereby 'altering its 
price'.80 As part of the provisions governing the conditions for the free 
movement of goods, Article 30, however, like the concept of equivalent 
effect in Article 34 TFEU (see below), is to be interpreted strictly and thus 
takes a broad, effects-based approach.81 
 
Therefore, as was also pointed out here at the outset, it is not necessary 
that a given charge is one specifically levied on goods or specifically relates 
to goods. '[A]ny pecuniary charge' can be caught by Article 30 for any price 
effect it might have, as long as that price effect arises due to the fact alone, 
that the goods 'cross a frontier'.82 As a consequence, a road usage charge 
that also affects goods is not in principle excluded from the scope of 
application of Article 30 because it is not a specific charge on goods. 
 
In addition, as was just shown in the principles section,83 the combined 
effect in the German example of road fees and a compensation mechanism 
means precisely that this is not a burden imposed as an integral part of the 
national tax system. Instead, that fee constitutes a unilateral burden that 
                                                
77 For more, eg, Barnard  (n 69), 44 ff. 
78 Case 24/68 Commission/Italy ECLI:EU:C:1969:29, para 9. 
79 Barnard (n 69), 50. 
80 Both citations Deutschmann (n 73), 473. 
81 To that effect Case 46/76 Bauhuis ECLI:EU:C:1977:6, para 12. 
82 Both citations Bauhuis (n 81), para 10. 
83 See at n 76. 
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only foreign transporters are subjected to because they cross the border 
into the respective Member State. 
 
Indeed, a road usage fee applicable to the whole of the national system of 
high-level, interconnecting roads such as motorways affects those goods 
only 'by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier':84 high-level roads are 
typical points of entry for commercial transporters of goods from other 
Member States. The electronic permit must be purchased at the border or 
before the border is crossed and constitutes the precondition for goods 
transported in small vehicles to cross the border into Germany. Crossing 
the border into Germany is thus the relevant act that triggers the 
obligation to pay. 
 
b. Return for a Service? 
Nonetheless, not all charges levied at the border run counter to Article 30. 
A charge is not caught by Article 30 if collected in return to a service or 
'benefit provided … for the exporter representing an amount proportionate 
to the said benefit'.85 General advantages will however not suffice: the 
operator must obtain 'a definite specific benefit'86 in return.87 
 
In return for a road charge, goods transporters may use the national system 
of roads, particularly motorways. The provision and maintenance of high-
speed road links can be seen as a service that sets off the charge. That 
service is also directly consumed by those paying the charge and thus 
constitutes a sufficiently specific benefit in the aforementioned sense. 
 
What remains open in the German example is whether the fee is also 
proportionate in the sense that it corresponds to the actual value of the 
consumed service. Proportionality is hard to measure for the yearly total of 
that fee, as the charges currently applicable in those Member States that 
have implemented road charges vary greatly (from around 30 to around 150 
euros).88 In addition, it is hard to compare those existing examples to one 
another, as proportionality of a charge will depend particularly on the local 
price level and on the size and quality of the road system made available in 
return for the charge. In Germany, the price level is somewhat above the 
European average. The quality of the (often aged) motorways is average at 
best, but their number is quite large. 
 
Proportionality can, however, be measured within the system itself, ie by 
relating the cost of permits for shorter periods to the yearly price. The 
2012 Communication provides some coarse guidance in that regard: rates 
should be around 10% monthly, 5% weekly and 2% daily in relation to the 
                                                
84 Bauhuis (n 81), para 10. 
85 ibid, para 11. 
86 Case 18/87 Commission/Germany ECLI:EU:C:1988:453, para 7. 
87 Also Barnard (n 69), 50 ff. 
88 See the overview in the Annex to Communication 2012 (n 7). 
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price for a year's use.89 In Germany, 10-day and two-month permits will be 
available at 5 to 15 Euros and 16 to 30 Euros respectively, with the upper 
price always being the one applicable to heavy polluters.90 Measured 
against the yearly maximum charge of 130 Euros (ie the ceiling applicable 
to heavy polluters),91 fees for short-term use would thus range between 3,85 
and 11,54 % for ten days and 12,31 and 23,08 % for two months. This 
exceeds Commission recommendations by approximately 15% of the 
relative fee level. If heavy polluters are therefore compared to one another, 
year-long users receive preferential treatment to short-term users if 
measured against the recommendations in the Communication. That 
effect is, in particular, not in line with the polluter-pays principle, which is 
also recognized in the Communication.92 
 
On average, Germany expects the yearly fee paid by most vehicle owners 
to be around 80 euros.93 If the averages are compared to one another (10 
Euros for 10 days, 22 Euros for two months), the picture is the same: the 
10-day fee will be set at 12,50% of the average, the two-month fee even at 
27,50 %. Here again therefore, Commission recommendations are 
exceeded by between 1/4th and 1/3rd of the relative fee level and short-term 
users are put at an even clearer disadvantage. 
 
The disproportionality of the fees for short-term use in relation to yearly 
use in the German example indicates that the users pay more than the 
service rendered is actually worth. At the same time, that disproportionate 
fee affects the price of goods at the occasion of their importation into, or 
transit through, Germany. In consequence, the road usage fee for light 
vehicles in Germany likely contravenes the prohibition of charges having 
equivalent effect as customs duties laid down in Article 30 insofar as it 
includes, and hence affects, transporters of goods in light vehicles. 
 
C. Traffic Charges As Discriminatory Indirect Taxes? 
Article 110 TFEU prohibits discriminatory indirect taxation for similar 
types of goods and substitutable (ie competing) goods. Already from its 
wording ('any internal taxation of any kind'), Article 110 takes the same 
broad, effects-based approach as Article 30 (and Article 34)94 that 
encompasses any 'disguised restrictions on the free movement of goods 
which may result from the tax provisions of a Member State.'95 
 
                                                
89 ibid, 7. 
90 BTDrs 18/4455 (n 13), 14. 
91 Anlage zu § 8 InfrastrukturabgabenG (n 13). 
92 Communication 2012 (n 7), 1. 
93 BTDrs 18/3990 (n 13), 30, sets the average at 74 euros, subsequent estimates are 
higher. 
94 See n 81. 
95 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:372, para 26; also Opinion AG Mengozzi, Case C-206/06 Essent 
Netwerk ECLI:EU:C:2008:33, para 43. 
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As was pointed out here at the outset, non-goods specific charges are 
therefore in principle caught by Article 110.96 The Court has repeatedly 
held in the past that the provision applies to 'a tax which in fact 
compensates for taxes which are imposed on the activity of the 
undertaking and not on the products as such.'97 This includes, in particular 
'a charge imposed on the international transport of goods by road.'98 
Consequently, Article 110 demands that road usage charges, which are a 
form of 'tax which has an immediate effect on the cost of the national and 
imported product must … be applied in a manner which is not 
discriminatory to imported products.'99 
 
Nonetheless, Article 110 is not applicable to a combined road charges 
mechanism like the German one, ie that affords the full domestic 
compensation for the charge.100 As was just shown, the prohibition of 
Article 30 was considered to be applicable because a combined assessment 
of the interaction of the two legs of the German mechanism show that the 
fee borne by imported goods there was fully compensated domestically. 
Thus, leeway for an assessment under Article 110 would open up only if the 
two legs of the mechanism were to be artificially separated. 
 
In the latter case, however, no discrimination of similar goods and no 
protective effect for competing goods would arise either: if the German 
road usage fee is looked at by itself, the level of fees is the same for 
domestic and imported goods. There would thus be no room for 
application of Article 110 without there being a need to even enter into the 
questions of similarity of the goods affected, insofar as domestic and 
foreign goods across the board would be treated alike. 
 
In short therefore, Article 110 is in any case irrelevant to a road charge 
mechanism that, like in Germany, affords full domestic compensation:101 
when the legs of the mechanism are artificially separated, there is no 
discriminatory effect in the sense of Article 110. When the legs are 
examined together, the fact that the charge is fully compensated through 
the rebate on motor vehicles tax means that the (relatively stricter) 
prohibition of Article 30 is to be applied. A merely partial domestic 
compensation would, by contrast, open the mechanism up for an 
assessment (not undertaken here) under Article 110. 
 
 
 
                                                
96 Different (applicability to specific goods charges only) however Korte and  
Gurreck (n 11), 425; Christian Seiler, Art 110, para 22, in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard 
Hilf and Martin Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der europäischen Union – Kommentar, 43rd 
supp 2011. 
97 Schöttle (n 65), para 14; see also the case-law cited in n 65. 
98 Schöttle (n 65), para 16 (there: distance- and weight based charges). 
99 ibid, para 15. 
100 Apparently different however Kainer and Ponterlitschek  (n 11), 200. 
101 Likewise (but with different reasoning) Korte and Gurreck (n 11), 425. 
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3. Goods Transported Over Motorways: Article 34 TFEU 
Article 34 TFEU prohibits measures of an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions on the importation of goods. Like the Articles 30 and 110 that 
were just discussed, Article 34 is concerned with the effects of national 
provisions on the free flow of goods in the internal market. 
 
As was explained aleady at the outset, the norms are mutually exclusive: 
“[A]ccording to settled case-law [Article 34] does not extend to the 
obstacles to trade covered by other specific provisions and obstacles of a 
fiscal nature or having an effect equivalent to customs duties, which are 
covered by Articles [30 or 110].”102 Although the Court is sometimes less 
strict and seems to accept the application of Article 34 to customs- or tax-
like measures when the effects on the free movement of goods are 
particularly intense,103 Article 34 will normally not apply to a road fee 
mechanism. 
 
Insofar as Articles 30 or 110 are considered relevant to a road charge 
collected already at the frontier as goods enter into a Member State, there 
is thus no room left for subjecting those charges to an additional test under 
Articles 34 and (for justification) 36 TFEU.104 However, as was also already 
highlighted at the beginning, where the applicability of all customs- or tax-
related norms was dismissed for a lack of relevant effects of the 
mechanism, this might re-direct attention to Article 34 as regards 
potentially restrictive effects of non-tax parts of the measure. This may 
admittedly be a remote possibility only, but it is still to be dealt with here 
for the sake of completeness of the argument. 
 
Just above, it was argued that Article 30 in particular is applicable to road 
charges like the German ones. However, that assessment hinges upon a 
number of assumptions related to the facts of the case, such as the 
applicability of Article 30 to measures with indirect effects on goods, the 
combined examination of the fee and rebate mechanism and the 
inadequacy of the charge in relation to the service returned. One may 
however also look at the facts differently and focus less on the price effect 
for goods of the fee mechanism and more on the general effect of the 
measure of rendering goods transport into or via Germany less attractive. 
Insofar as these facts were to be assessed differently, eg by emphasizing 
indirect non-tax effects of the fee measure, room for scrutiny under Article 
34 might open up.105 
 
If that exercise succeeds, an assessment under Article 34 might be 
relatively more attractive for the Member State concerned than under the 
strict standard of Article 30 because of the possibility of justification 
                                                
102 Case C-313/05 Brzeziński ECLI:EU:C:2007:33, para 50; see also the case-law cited in 
n 29. 
103 See n 30. 
104 Already Case 7/68 Commission/Italy ECLI:EU:C:1968:51, 430. 
105 Commission/Italy (n 104), 430 
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afforded by the former norm. As it will be shown on the German example, 
it is of course not a given that any such justification attempts would 
succeed. 
 
A. Effect on Goods 
The effect of roads charges on goods was already explained in the 
introduction to this section. It is thus only briefly restated here for the 
sake of completeness. On top of the price effect dealt with above in the 
context of Article 30, which poses an extra burden on transporters, the 
measure might also have a generally impeding effect on the flow of goods 
in the internal market, via Germany. The measure might thus have the 
potential indirect effect of impeding the cross-border flow of goods in the 
internal market.106 As was shown, this is enough to bring such a charge 
within the scope of application of Article 34, without there being a need to 
quantify a specific minimum scale or threshold of that effect.107 
 
Article 34 has a markedly broad scope of application that covers any 
measure 'taken by a Member State, the aim or effect of which is to treat 
goods coming from other Member States less favourably' or 'which hinders 
access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a 
Member State'.108 A road charge with a price effect on transported goods 
would, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 34 for its potential of 
hindering goods trade in the internal market. 
 
B. Disadvantage for Foreign Goods 
Yet, the Court in its older jurisprudence carved out certain selling 
arrangements from the scope of application of Article 34.109 Selling 
arrangements are rules stipulating the conditions under which a product is 
sold, eg the place or time of sale, but also its price.110 A road charge 
rendering the sale of goods in a Member State more expensive could 
generally qualify as a mere selling arrangement and thus fall outside the 
otherwise broad scope of Article 34.111 
 
However, the exception only applies to selling arrangements that actually 
'apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so 
long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of 
domestic products and of those from other Member States.'112 Whereas, 
therefore, national road charges with price effects that are absolutely equal 
in their effects for foreign and domestic goods are not caught by Article 
                                                
106 Case C-110/05 Commission/Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:66, para 33. 
107 See at n 67. 
108 Case 142/05 Mickelsson ECLI:EU:C:2009:336, para 24. 
109 Joined Cases C‑267/91 and C‑268/91 Keck and Mithouard ECLI:EU:C:1993:905, 
para 16. 
110 Already Keck (n 109), para 18. 
111 Also Stefan Leible and Rudolf Streinz, Art 34, para 98, in Eberhard Grabitz, 
Meinhard Hilf and Martin Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der europäischen Union – 
Kommentar, 55th supp 2015. 
112 Keck (n 109), para 16. 
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34, any charge that puts foreign products at a greater disadvantage or even 
discriminates against such products is still included in its scope of 
application. 
 
At this point again therefore, the question returns whether a two-legged 
mechanism, like the German road usage fees and tax rebates, is examined 
together or separately. Depending on the approach to this issue, a road 
usage fee will or will not be caught by Article 34. 
 
A combined examination of the German example reveals that foreign 
transporters, and thus foreign goods, are discriminated against, as from an 
economic point of view they alone bear the road fee while goods 
transported by domestic vehicle owners are spared. Thus, in its combined 
effects , the German road fee mechanism is equally applicable only in law, 
while it does not in fact affect domestic and foreign operators and goods in 
the same manner. This is therefore not just a measure of unequal effects 
but, an indirectly discriminatory measure that subjects foreign operators 
and goods to less favorable conditions only because of their non-German 
place of vehicle registration. A discriminatory measure can never qualify as 
a mere selling arrangement. A measure of this kind therefore always falls 
within the scope of Article 34. 
 
If, by contrast, the two legs of such a mechanism were to be artificially 
separated and the road fee was examined on its own, it would look like a 
mere selling arrangement: insofar as it applies in law to 'all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory'113 and the measure's unequal effects 
resulting from the granting of a tax rebate would be blinded out, that 
measure would fall outside the scope of Article 34. It was, however, shown 
above that such a separate examination would be inappropriate in the 
German case. 
 
C. No Justification 
Insofar as the combined road fee and tax rebate mechanism in the German 
example is caught by Article 34, it can also not be justified under Article 36 
TFEU or additional mandatory requirements114 of public interest. 
 
Firstly, mandatory requirements beyond Article 36 are likely115 to be 
available only for indistinctly applicable measures.116 The combined road 
charges and rebate mechanism is, however, precisely not indistinctly 
applicable.  
 
                                                
113 ibid. 
114 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, para 8. 
115 Jurisprudence has seen a few exceptions, eg in Case C-2/90 Commission/Belgium, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:310, para 22 ff. 
116 Eg Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours ECLI:EU:C:1990:121, para 14; Joined Cases C-
321/94 to C-324/94 Pistre ECLI:EU:C:1996:401, para 53; for more, cf  Barnard (n 69), 
100 ff. 
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Secondly, the only visible aim behind including foreigners and excluding 
domestic vehicle owners from the road usage fee is economic. According 
to settled case-law aims of a purely economic nature cannot normally 
constitute overriding reasons in the public interest that justify restricting a 
fundamental guarantees of EU law.117 This principle applies at least below 
the threshold of costs jeopardizing the overall equilibrium of an area (eg 
equilibrium of the social security system, the education system, or, for the 
case at hand, the infrastructure system).118 
 
In conclusion therefore, were, contrary to the argument made here, the 
combined road fees and rebate mechanism devised for Germany to 
beconsidered not to be caught by Article 30, it might alternatively be 
caught by Article 34 as a measure discriminating against goods transported 
in foreign-registered vehicles.119 In the absence of legitimate reasons for 
justification, that mechanism would also infringe Article 34. 
 
4. Services Relying on Motorways: Article 56 TFEU 
Another120 EU law provision that a road charge might be suspected to run 
counter to is the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU. 
After all, such a charge would not only, as was just shown in the context of 
Articles 30, 34 and 110, have a price effect for goods transported into or 
through a Member State, but also for services rendered in that Member 
State or where service providers pass through. 
 
Similarly to Article 34, Article 56 is subject to a broad, effects-based 
approach: it 'requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against 
a person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the 
abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to 
national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when 
it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides 
similar services.'121 A charge levied on road use would in principle qualify as 
a measure that renders the cross-border provision of services less attractive 
and thus falls within the scope of the prohibition of Article 56. 
 
However, similarly to Article 34, a specific exception from the scope of the 
prohibition applies also in the context of Article 56. Selling arrangements, 
                                                
117 Case C‑109/04 Kranemann ECLI:EU:C:2005:187, para 34; Case 352/85 Bond van 
Adverteerders ECLI:EU:C:1988:196, para 34; Case C-288/89 Gouda 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:323, para 11; Case C-398/95 SETTG ECLI:EU:C:1997:282, para 23; 
Case C-35/98 Verkooijen ECLI:EU:C:2000:294, para 48; Case 388/01 Commission/Italy, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:30, para 22. 
118 Eg Case 147/03 Commission/Austria ECLI:EU:C:2005:427, para 64 ff; Case 293/83 
Gravier ECLI:EU:C:1985:69, para 18. 
119 Also Lukas Beck (n 11), 289. 
120 For an assessment also under Art 45 TFEU, cf Kainer and  Ponterlitschek (n 11), 
200. 
121 Case C-76/90 Säger ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, para 12. 
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the area excluded for Article 34, do not play a role here.122 Instead, the 
Treaty directly stipulates a specific exception. Article 58(1) TFEU excludes 
the applicability of Article 56 in the area of transport services.123 Transport 
services are instead exclusively governed by the provisions of the Transport 
Chapter, which was discussed before. 
 
Article 56(1) is therefore not directly relevant for the assessment of road 
charges.124 Still, it was shown before that also under the rules applicable to 
transport services under the Transport Chapter, a combined road fee and 
tax rebate mechanism is contrary to EU law. 
 
5. Artice 18 TFEU and the Proportionality Principle 
 
The 2012 Communication recalls that traffic charges on light vehicles must 
be in line with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
under Article 18 TFEU and with EU law's general proportionality 
principle.125 Both principles only apply subsidiarily to the provisions 
examined here before, as these contain the more context-specific 
prohibitions of discrimination. 
 
Room for application of these more general standards is therefore 
restricted to two constellations: they may, firstly, become relevant because 
the applicability of the remaining provisions was, contrary to the argument 
made here, rejected. Secondly and more importantly, they are relevant in 
relation to users not covered by those other (essentially goods- and 
transport related) norms. A look at the general principles is thus warranted 
particularly for the effects of the road usage charges on non-commercial 
traffic and on commercial traffic not relating to goods and services. 
 
Still, the outcome of an examination under Article 18 and the general 
proportionality principle would eventually not be any different if those 
other norms are blinded out. What is more, the outcome is also the same 
irrespective of whether the two legs of the measure at hand are artificially 
separated or looked at for their combined effects. In both cases, they fall 
foul of the proportionality and non-discrimination principles.126 The 
differences between a separate and a combined examination are therefore 
just a question of degree of severity of the infringement of those principles. 
 
A. A Separate Examination of a Combined Fee and Rebate Mechanism 
It was shown before in the context of Article 30 that while the objective 
appropriateness of an overall level of road charges cannot easily be 
                                                
122 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments ECLI:EU:C:1995:126, para 36. 
123 See also Korte and Gurreck (n 11), 428. 
124 Apparently different however a considerable part of German literature, cf  Beck (n 
11), 289; Kainer and  Ponterlitschek  (n 11), 200; Engel and Singbartl (n 11), 289 ff. 
125 Communication 2012 (n 7), 4 ff. 
126 Equally Engel and Singbartl (n 11), 293; Boehme-Neßler (n 11), 100; different 
(compatibility with these principles)  Kainer andPonterlitschek(n 11), 201. 
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checked,127 the appropriateness of fees for short-term use can. It was also 
shown that the fees in the German case put short-term users at a 
disadvantage in relation to year-long users of vehicles within the same or 
similar emissions classes:128 those groups of users pay relatively more than 
their fair share of the yearly fee. 
 
The charge applied to light vehicles in the German example is therefore 
disproportionate in the light of the Commission's recommendations on fee 
levels.129 This is already so where it was unduly disregarded that domestic 
road users are fully compensated (ie when the two legs of the measure were 
examined separately). As it was shown, that kind of disproportionality 
becomes all the more problematic insofar as it also contravenes the 
polluter-pays logic relevant to infrastructure charges.130 
 
The effect of the German mechanism to place short-term users at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis year-long users with comparable vehicles moreover 
entails discrimination against non-nationals as year-long permits will 
typically be purchased by domestic users and short-term permits are 
primarily attractive for foreigners using national motorways on an irregular 
basis only. In the German case, there is no intrinsic explanation or 
justification for this effect. Quite to the contrary: the polluter-pays 
principle would imply that groups who use infrastructure more frequently 
should bear a relatively heavier burden to discourage use.131 Under such 
circumstances therefore, a road charge would have a discriminatory effect 
in the meaning of Article 18 TFEU even if the fact that domestic road 
users are fully compensated was unduly blinded out.132 
 
B. Combined Examination of a Fee and Rebate Mechanism 
When the two legs of a fee and rebate mechanism are examined together, 
the discriminatory effect just observed is even more straightforward: given 
that domestic users are fully compensated for their share of the charge by 
way of a corresponding rebate (in Germany: on motor vehicles tax), the 
charge constitutes an extra burden for non-nationals only. As was stated 
before, a combined examination looking at the effects, not the form, of the 
mechanism is also the only appropriate approach under EU law.133 
 
Again, no intrinsic explanation or justification is visible here.134 Given the 
importance of mutual access to infrastructure interconnecting the 
Member States of the Union, any restrictions on that access weigh 
particularly heavy and would, accordingly, call for a particularly pressing 
and convincing justification. In particular, an argument to the effect that 
                                                
127 See n 88. 
128 See nn 91 and 93. 
129 See n 89. 
130 See n 92. 
131 With a different outcome Kainer and Ponterlitschek (n 11), 201. 
132 Similarly Münzing (n 2) 198. 
133 Likewise (but with a different outcome) Kainer and Ponterlitschek (n 11), 200. 
134 Boehme-Neßler (n 11), 99 ff. 
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domestic taxpayers already finance the building and maintenance of 
infrastructure by way of their general tax obligations and that foreigners 
should contribute their share is not valid: as was shown before in the 
context of Article 34, aims of a purely economic nature will normally not 
serve as reasons of public interest justifying restrictions.135 This certainly 
applies as long as, which will not typically be the case and is certainly not 
the case for Germany, the overall equilibrium of the infrastructure system 
was not jeopardized by the fact that foreigners have free access to 
domestic roads.136  
 
Simple financial considerations alone, ie the normal cost effect of building 
and upkeeping infrastructure benefiting also non-nationals, will thus not 
justify the imposition of a light vehicles charge on foreign users only. Such 
a charge, like the combined German fee and rebate mechanism, would 
thus amount to discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
 
IV. SEPARATION OF FEE AND REBATE MECHANISMS IN TIME? 
 
In the context of the German case, the Commission apparently suggested 
recently that separation of the two legs in time, ie the implementation first 
of a general usage fee and only at a later point in time of a lowering of 
vehicles taxes for German-registered vehicles, might justify an isolated 
assessment of the fee mechanism only.137 
 
1. Separation Would End Most, But Not All Concerns 
Such a separation would indeed render the fee mechanism compatible with 
Article 92 insofar as the imposition of a fee for everybody would no longer 
be discriminatory and the conditions of competition between foreign and 
domestic carriers would remain equitable (at the new level of X for all). 
The same applies to discrimination under Article 18. Also, the severing of 
ties between the fee and corresponding changes to the motor vehicles tax 
law would eliminate concerns of incompatibility with the 1965 Decision.  
 
If the fees were not fully set off by way of a rebate any more, the effects of 
the fee would no longer qualify as a measure equivalent to a customs duty 
in the sense of Article 30, but would instead have to be examined under 
the discrimination and protectionism tests of Article 110. The outcome of 
the test under Article 110 is not quite straightforward. As was shown in the 
context of Article 30, the German mechanism yields indications that the 
fee level for short-term users might be disproportionate. This would 
evidently also have to be taken into account when assessing any protective 
effect of the fee for non-competing products under Article 110(2). 
                                                
135 See n 117. 
136 See n 118. 
137 derstandard.at online version of 3 June 2015, 'Deutsche Pkw-Maut: EU schlägt 
schrittweise Einführung vor'; welt.de online version of 3 June 2015, 'Brüssels Nein zur 
Pkw-Maut würde Millionen kosten'; wiwo.de online version of 3 June 2015, 'EU 
schlägt schrittweise Einführung vor'. 
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This, however, also means that a separation of the measures could not end 
concerns under the general proportionality principle. Discrepancies with 
the standards of proportionality required in particular under the 2012 
Commission Communication would therefore remain and require an 
adaptation of the fee levels for short-term users. 
 
This, finally, leads over to Article 34. It was shown here that if the fee 
imposed was examined alone, ancillary effects of that fee might potentiall 
be covered by Article 34, but would still fall outside the scope of Article 34 
as a selling arrangement. However, that would only be so if the fees were 
indeed indiscriminate in their effects for domestic and foreign users. 
 
Disproportionate fee levels for short-term users, who will typically be 
foreigners, would mean that the effects of the fee are not indiscriminate 
for foreign and domestic goods, but that foreign goods will typically be 
more affected by the fee.138 If that is so, even a separation of the two legs 
would not end potential concerns against the fee under Article 34. In 
addition, justification under Article 36 and a rule of reason would face 
problems of explaining that disproportionate effect particularly in view of 
the fact that it is, as was also shown, in particular not in line with the 
polluter-pays logic. 
 
2. Qualitative Requirements for Separation 
Even in respect of the areas just mentioned above, where the separation 
might work to eliminate concerns (Articles 30 and 92), it was however 
pointed out before that EU law generally takes a functionalist approach, ie 
looks at the actual effects of the mechanism as a whole and not at formal 
circumstances. This means that any attempt to separate fee and rebate 
mechanisms from one another, which in the German case are factually and 
legally closely intertwined, must amount to far-reaching structural changes 
that bring the complementary character and combined effects of the two 
legs of the mechanism genuinely to end. 
 
To factually end the complementary character and combined effects of the 
two legs of the mechanism, changes on two levels will likely be necessary. 
 
One change is, clearly, a distinct timely separation of the implementation 
of each of the legs. In view of the German mechanism's political history, 
whereby the aim to exempt German-registered vehicles from the fee 
formed the central focus from beginning to end, the timely separation 
would probably have to be drastic to be convincing. Convincing means, 
that the timely separation credibly demonstrates that the intended 
beneficial economic effect for German-registered vehicles no longer 
occurs. The timely separation must, in other words, warrant a delay 
sufficiently large to forestall changes to the conditions of competition 
between domestic and foreign carriers. This will be so only if German-
registered users are required to start paying fees along with everybody else 
                                                
138 To that effect Case C-322/01 DocMorris ECLI:EU:C:2003:664, para 70 ff. 
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long before possible competitive effects of a lowering of motor vehicles 
taxes kicks in. We are, in other words, likely speaking of several years here. 
 
A timely separation alone will, however, not suffice, if the rebate 
eventually granted still corresponds exactly to the amount of the usage fees 
paid. As long as the two legs of the measure exactly match each other in 
value, the link between them can never credibly be separated and the 
competitive effects of neutralization of the usage fee burden for German-
registered carriers will effectively occur. A credible separation of the two 
legs of the measure will therefore, in addition to a delay in time, also 
require changes in the calculation and amount of the lowering of motor 
vehicles taxes. In other words, the German government's promise of 
guaranteed economic neutrality of the usage fee for each individual 
German-registered vehicle owner would have to be abandoned. Some 
easing of the motor vehicles tax burden according to the logics of that field 
of taxation is acceptable and part of sovereign national taxation, 
guaranteed neutrality in terms of a prolongation or export of the logics 
applicable to the road usage fees into the tax system is not. 
 
Whether the Commission's compromise proposal139 thus actually ends the 
concerns over the design of the light vehicles traffic fee in the German 
case will depend on how sincere the German legislator's approach in that 
regard will be. Beyond the German case, the considerations laid out here 
provide general guidelines for the assessment of road fee mechanisms that, 
as often, seek to mitigate burdening effects on domestic users. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
The introduction of road charges in the hitherto harmonized area of light 
vehicles traffic must conform to a number of provisions in primary and 
secondary EU law, far beyond the mere principles of non-discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality and respect for proportionality that are 
mentioned in the Commission's 2012 Notice. These provisions have more 
precise scope of application than the more general norms invoked by the 
Commission and therefore allow for a relatively more precise scrutiny of 
national measures as regards their compatibility with the aims of the 
internal market. As the more specific norms, they also enjoy preferred 
application vis-à-vis the general principles. 
 
The foregoing examination revealed that Member States have the 
possibility to introduce road charges for light traffic, but that their legality 
depends on a number of factors. Particularly stringent in that regard are 
the limits set by the TFEU's traffic-related provisions, namely Decision 
65/271 on the secondary law level and Art 92 on the level of primary law. 
Those provisions of the Transport Chapter exclude the applicability of 
Article 56 regarding the effects of the charge for the provision of transport 
services. While the former prohibits certain forms of double taxation and 
                                                
139 See n 137. 
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goods taxes, the latter sets out a stringent non-discrimination and 
standstill regime that recognizes that the conditions of road access for 
foreigners constitute a decisive factor in cross-border competition and that 
seeks to protect those conditions against deterioration. As the German 
example shows, the imposition of road fees may run counter to both sets 
of norms. 
 
Also beyond the Transport Chapter, the Treaty sets limits to Member 
States' freedom to impose charges on light traffic. The most decisive 
norms in that regard are Articles 30, 34 and 110, all of which deal with the 
price effects of a road charge on transported goods. Depending on how 
such a charge is devised, it will likely come within the scope of application 
of either one of those norms (which are alternative, not cumulative). 
Furthermore depending on the design of the charge and on which of the  
treaty articles applies, any negative effects of the charge on the conditions 
under which goods can be marketed might be justified by overriding 
reasons of public interest. Article 30 is however not open to such 
arguments. For Articles 110, they are part of the discrimination assessment 
undertaken in this paper. A justification assessment in the classic sense is 
thus only available in the context of Article 34. However, given the 
importance of mutual access to infrastructure interconnecting the 
Member States of the Union, the reasons given would have to be 
particularly convincing. The two-legged mechanism in the German 
example was, due to the fact that the fees are charged only because the 
border into Germany is crossed and because the fees imposed are fully set-
off regarding domestic goods, qualified here as a charge of equivalent 
effect to a customs duty under Article 30, which runs into an absolute 
prohibition without the possibility for justification. 
 
Thus, in sum, Article 18 and the general proportionality principle have a 
very limited scope of application here – if any. Article 92 applies to all 
charges affecting commercial transport service providers, whereas Articles 
30, 34 and 110 catch all negative effects of the charge on the price of goods 
transported by foreign carriers. Potentially also, road charges might also 
conflict with the free movement of workers under Article 45 TFEU.140 
 
All of this effectively limits the relevance of the general prohibitions to the 
non-commercial sphere. There too, however, Decision 65/271 applies in 
terms of a potential double taxation of (commercial as well as non-
commercial) vehicle owners through a road use charge. As the German 
example shows, a road charge that is designed to grant a rebate on vehicles 
taxation to offset the domestic effects of the road charge might qualify as 
such prohibited instance of double taxation. In such a case, there remains 
effectively no set of facts for which an assessment under the general 
principles would still be relevant. 
 
                                                
140 See n 28. Arguably however, those effects might finally be too remote, cf Case C-
190/98 Graf ECLI:EU:C:2000:49, para 15 ff. 
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Another important conclusion from the foregoing assessment is that, of 
course, road charges are particularly problematic where, as in the German 
example, they are effectively imposed on foreigners only. Whether that is 
done directly in terms of a foreigner-only law or, as in Germany, indirectly 
via a combination of formally separate mechanisms leading to the same 
effect, makes no difference under the generally effects-based approach of 
EU law. Any other approach would abet the circumvention of EU law. 
 
Concerns of possible circumvention arise in particular where, as the 
Commission apparently suggested for the German case, the imposition of 
traffic fees is flanked by an easing of the overall tax burden, but the ties 
between those two measures in time and fact should be blurred.141 It is 
possible to flank the introduction of traffic fees by changes to the overall 
domestic tax burden, but the threshold for legality of such an approach 
would be quite high. That threshold is one of effect, not form: The 
separation in time and functioning must be genuine in the sense that 
competitive cross-effects are forestalled. This calls for a delay of several 
years between such measures to allow competitive effects to kick in 
equally, as well as for the non-neutrality of the overall cross-effects of the 
package in the sense that the flanking changes may not be designed 
precisely so as to neutralize the effects of the charge. This also means that 
flanking tax law changes must follow their own logic and may not just 
implement or import fee calculation logics into the tax system. 
 
In the absence of the peculiarities of the German case, road charges that 
are truly indistinctly applicable will have to be checked under Article 92 
only, ie for a potential alteration of the conditions of competition in road 
transport. If collected at the border because the border is crossed, they 
may also come within the ambit of Article 30. They will, however, stay 
clear of that Article if it can be shown that those charges are part of a 
general system of internal taxation (and should thus be checked under 
Article 110 where, however, a non-discriminatory applicable charge will not 
run into problems). By contrast, Article 34 will never pose an obstacle to an 
indistinctly applicable road charge, which is essentially a selling 
arrangement excluded from its scope. 
 
The German case demonstrates the difficulties encountered by national 
legislators in the attempt to come to terms with the opposing needs of 
generating sufficient revenue for the expansion and maintenance of 
infrastructure on the one hand,  while not significantly increasing the cost 
base for domestic undertakings and users on the other hand.142 Although 
those difficulties might arguably be overcome in a more elegant manner 
that is less invasive for the functioning of the internal market than in the 
German example, even a more cautious national legislator will experience 
them in one form or another. 
 
                                                
141 See n 137. 
142 Cf also Maaß (n 11), 449 ff. 
2015]         Rolling Pennies on the Road      156 
For this reason, the Commission's announcement that it would not just try 
to swat down the German fee mechanism, but also use the occasion to try 
to push for a more general solution to light traffic road pricing is to be 
particularly welcomed. In that regard, the Commission is apparently143 set 
to elaborate an EU-wide framework for light traffic charges that might 
look similar to the Eurovignette Directive for HGV traffic in terms of 
type and depth of regulation. Unlike the existing system for HGVs, such a 
framework could address especially the needs of the users for small travel. 
 
Current Commission plans envisage distance-based instead of time-based 
usage fees. This would be more in line with the polluter-pays principle, but 
it would also require relatively more infrastructure on the road (toll booths 
or electronic equipment on roads and in vehicles) and accordingly 
relatively more administrative effort both on the part of users as well as  
Member States. In addition, distance-based systems are significantly more 
sensitive in terms of data protection. In other words, the factual, legal and 
thus political hurdles for an EU-wide distance-based road charge system 
for light traffic are not to be underestimated. 
 
That is likely one of the reasons why the Commission is currently only 
aiming at a voluntary scheme in which Member States could decide to opt 
in. A voluntary scheme would not clear out all problems Member States 
currently experience in the setup of road charges: since that scheme might 
not fit particular national needs or limitations (of infrastructure, but 
importantly also of national constitutional law), Member States might still 
be inclined to go their own ways. However, even a voluntary scheme would 
at least provide an initial point for orientation as to the principles that 
national road charges for light traffic could and should follow to minimize 
their negative effects for the internal market and maximize their 
environmental steering effects. 
 
And Germany? Who knows – should the Court of Justice bring its 
envisaged road fee and tax rebate mechanism to a fall, perhaps Germany 
might even join an optional EU-wide tolling system next time around.  
                                                
143 Cf Reuters UK of 30 January 2015, 'EU-wide toll could end road spat with 
Germany' (accessed  2 June 2015) at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/30/eu-
transportation-idUKL6N0V94LM20150130. 
